|
© 2001 Elias M. Gordan
All rights reserved
Law Office of
Elias M. Gordan
Post Office Box 60
Palos Park, IL 60464
Phone 708.923.9735
Email gordanlaw@att.net
Web www.gordanlaw.com
|
Law Office of Elias M. Gordan
Supreme Court Revisits Landmark DBE Case, then Refuses It
(March 27 2001, updated December 5, 2001). On November 27, 2001, the United States Supreme Court refused to decide a challenge to DBE/set-aside requirements in federal highway programs. The case, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, ("Adarand VIII", named after its 8th trip to the courts, and the new Secretary of Transportation), Case No.00-730 (2001), was supposed be an acid test of the Bush administration's commitment to affirmative action in Federal construction procurement. The Supreme Court originally agreed to consider the case, and had heard oral arguments, by both sides of the dispute, on October 31. But after hearing the arguments, the Court decided that new arguments had been presented, which were not included in the original request to hear the case. Therefore, the Court concluded that they were mistaken to hear the case in the first place.
Adarand started in 1989, with a $20,000 bid for guardrail work on a highway project. The Federal Government had let a prime contract for 5 miles of paving work in a National Park in Colorado. Adarand, a non-minority-owned guardrail contractor, would bid on every guardrail job in Colorado, and, in fact, submitted the lowest bid for the paving job in question. Despite his low bid, Adarand did not get the work, due to a "Subcontractor Compensation Clause" which provided additional compensation to a prime contractor for retaining small businesses controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals". The "Subcontractor Compensation Clause" required the prime contractor to presume that "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals" included certain racial minority groups. The prime contractor, Mountain Gravel, admitted under oath that Adarand would have received the subcontract were it not for the "Subcontractor Compensation Clause".
Adarand sued the Federal Government, claiming that the "Subcontractor Compensation Clause" violated his equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. He sought a declaration by the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, that the "Subcontractor Compensation Clause" was illegal and void, and also sought an injunction against future enforcement of the "Subcontractor Compensation Clause". The District Court in Colorado, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. vs. Skinner, ("Adarand I", 790 F. Supp. 240 (1992)) granted summary judgment to the Federal Government in 1992, upholding the Federal contract provision as constitutional, using a less-stringent constitutional standard. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment for the Government in 1994 (Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,16 F. 3d 1537 (1994) ["Adarand II"]). In 1995 (six years after the subcontract bid), the Supreme Court vacated, or refused to uphold, the judgment for the Government, and sent the case back to the District Court in Colorado, with instructions to proceed with the case, and apply a strict standard in determining whether the "Subcontractor Compensation Clause" was legal. (Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) ["Adarand III"])
Hear the oral arguments in Adarand III , and read the Supreme Court opinion on Northwestern University's "Oyez" Website ("Oyez", by the way, means "Hear ye" in Latin):
When there, click on "Cases", then go to "Search by Title" and type in Adarand
A "strict scrutiny" standard is the toughest standard that is applied to a government action, and is usually invoked when an important constitutional right is at stake. Under this standard, a government action will be upheld by a court only 1) if there is a compelling state purpose for the government action, and 2) when the means the government uses are narrowly tailored to accomplish the compelling state purpose. In Richmond vs. J.A.Croson (1989), the Supreme Court, using the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, applied this test to race-based "set-aside" programs implemented by State and local governments. The Adarand case extended this test to the Federal Government, since the 14th Amendment does not apply to the Federal Government.
NOTE: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently applied the Adarand test in a Federal defense contract, Rothe Development Corporation v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, decided August 20, 2001. To read the decision (MS Word executable file format), go to:
Upon the return of the case from the Supreme Court, the District Court found the "Subcontractor Compensation Clause", and race-based presumptions, unconstitutional. (Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 965 F. Supp. 1556 (1997) ["Adarand IV"]). In the court's opinion, the provisions failed strict scrutiny, because they were over-inclusive, by including non-disadvantaged minorities, and under-inclusive, by not including disadvantaged nonminorities. The court granted an injunction against the Department of Transportation. The United States Department of Transportation then appealed to the 10th Circuit Federal appeals court. Meanwhile, Adarand filed a second suit challenging the DBE requirements imposed by the State of Colorado. The State changed its DBE certification procedure, and granted Adarand DBE status for Colorado DOT jobs. Based on this, the appeals court dismissed the DOT's appeal as moot (after-the-fact) in 1999. (Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 169 F.3d 1292 (1999) ["Adarand V"]). The Supreme Court revisited the case, finding it unclear whether Adarand's new DBE certification was constitutional. They overruled the appeals court in January, 2000 (Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 120 S.Ct. 722 (2000)["Adarand VI"]) , and sent the case back down to the appeals court, for a determination of whether the earlier Supreme Court decision in Adarand III had been followed.
Read the Supreme Court opinion:
and go to case 99-295 (#18) on the case list
The appeals court then reviewed the Government's appeal in late 2000 ("Adarand VII"). While noting that the 1997 Colorado DBE program was unconstitutional, the appeals court sided with the Federal Government, holding:
"Since the District Court last considered this case, and after lengthy congressional hearings in response to the Adarand III decision, the Federal Government has significantly changed the way in which it implements the challenged race-conscious programs in highway construction contracting. It is ultimately our considered judgment that the SCC program and the DBE certification programs as currently structured, though not as they were structured in 1997 when the District Court last rendered judgment, pass constitutional muster. They are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest."
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, Case 97-1304 ("Adarand VII")
Read the Appeals Court Opinion :
Thirteen years, eight legal actions, seven decisions, six appeals, five appeals-court decisions, four Transportation Secretaries, three Presidents, two decades, and one millennium later, Adarand appealed to the Supreme Court a third time, asking the Justices to decide whether the first Supreme Court decision in 1995 ("Adarand III") was correctly followed in the "Adarand VII" decision of September, 2000, and to decide whether the current US Department of Transportation (USDOT) DBE program was constitutional.
However, the Supreme Court noted, that the appeals court in the 2000 "Adarand VII" decision, focused on DBE programs in contracts administered by State and local governments, using Federal funds. Adarand had challenged the Colorado DOT program in "Adarand V" and "Adarand VI", in addition to the direct Federal program in "Adarand I". Adarand, in his second 2001 brief to the Supreme Court, however, appeared to be challenging only DBE programs in contracts directly administered by the Federal Government, not the State/local contracts which used Federal funds. Remember, the $20,000 bid rejection in 1989 was for a Federal contract, not a Colorado DOT contract, since the work was being done on Federal land, in a national park.
The Supreme Court noted that State and local procurement for Federally-funded highway work was governed by the Federal TEA-21 (Transportation Equity Act) statute, while direct Federal procurement was governed by the Small Business Act. The Supreme Court was being asked to look at the "apples" of direct Federal contracts, while the lower courts had looked at the "oranges" of State/local contracts. Moreover, the Supreme Court noted, the 2000 "Adarand VII" decision specifically stated that Adarand did not have standing to challenge any programs other than State or local programs using Federal funds.
Since Adarand himself did not initially contest these issues in his third appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, waiting until October, 2001 to challenge this for the first time, the Supreme Court could not consider Adarand's appeal.
The moral of the story: Be careful of what you want, as you might actually get it, and nothing more.
Read the Supreme Court opinion in "Adarand VIII":
Scroll down to R-6, and click on "Adarand"
If you have further questions on DBE issues, please contact us.
708.923.9735
|